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Europe during the twentieth century, Shklar understood the terror that states could infl ict on individuals. 1 Summers, however, scoff s at the fears that post-Civil War Americans articulated, particularly their concern that the war might not be quite over, which he dismisses as "balderdash" (2) . According to Summers, fears that more violence was to come if the government failed to stop it, or that the republic had been forever changed and perhaps for the worse, by emancipation as well as the war's immense devastation, were often little more than a paranoid frenzy whipped up by politicians in Washington. Although Summers stops short of casting Radical Republicans as the Don Johns of this story, the fearmongering he describes itself borders on the sinister, conspiratorial behavior he sets out to expose. It is not clear if lawmakers themselves believed their own rhetoric, or if they were merely reproducing a political language that by 1865 had structured American politics in ways that complicate the question of intentionality.
Either way, Summer's major contention that postwar fears of a Union still imperiled were unfounded limits the book's potential contribution to our understanding of Reconstruction politics. Those who feared that the war did not end in April 1865 were far from paranoid. Reports of violence from the South, including the activities of "regulators" and other antifederal bands, provided convincing evidence that armed confl ict remained a troubling fact, especially in backcountry regions where little, if any, law enforcement or military presence existed. Moreover, brutal attacks against freedpeople signaled white southerners' refusal to accept the war's outcome, particularly the destruction of slavery. The Freedmen's Bureau papers drip with blood-not imaginary or metaphorical blood but real blood from real bodies. The fears of freedpeople, however, do not enter into Summer's account. For the most part, his story is centered in Washington, where the tendency toward hyperbole (and perhaps our own present-day disillusionment with political "insiders") makes it easy to dismiss congressional speech making as just that. It is more diffi cult to dismiss the reports of Freedmen's Bureau agents describing the torture and murder of freedpeople across the South, or the letters from freedpeople themselves begging state offi cials for protection. When Radical Republicans spoke of such behavior as indicative of ex-Confederates' determination to reverse the war's outcome and as a threat to the nation, they did so not out of blind panic or paranoia but rather a reasoned and reasonable understanding that the bonds of unity among Americans were extremely fragile. Unlike the "paranoid style" that animated Know-Nothings in the 1850s or even the revolutionary generation who saw Tory conspiracies at work all around them, the fears of the Reconstruction-era were responses to events that had actually transpired:
